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Abstract: Hannah Arendt’s On Violence (1970) is a seminal work in the study of political violence. It 
famously draws a distinction between power and violence and argues that the latter must be excluded 
from the political sphere. Although this may make Arendt’s text an appealing resource for critiques of 
rising political violence today, I argue that we should resist this temptation. In this article, I identify 
how the divisions and exclusions within her theory enable her to explicitly disavow violence on one 
level, while implicitly relying on a constitutive and racialized form of violence on another. In particular, 
Arendt leaves legal and state violence presumed, but untheorized, focusing her critique instead on 
dissident action, especially that of the Black Power movement. Any analysis that incorporates Arendt’s 
conceptual distinctions is therefore susceptible to reproducing a political theory that neglects state 
violence in the service of White rule, yet charges those who resist it with breaching the peace. 
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Chad KAUTZER  
 
Political Violence and Race: A Critique of Hannah Arendt 
 
Hannah Arendt’s On Violence (1970) is a seminal work in the study of political violence. The 
theoretical core of Arendt’s text is the categorical distinction she draws between power and violence 
and her claim that only the former, power, is appropriate to the political sphere. Like her friend Walter 
Benjamin, whose “Critique of Violence” (1921) has also become an influential text in analyses of 
political violence, Arendt focuses her critique on the instrumentality of violence. This instrumentality, 
she argues, is in principle inimical to political action and thus any attempt to use violence as a political 
means should be criticized and resisted without qualification. 
This apparent categorical exclusion of violence from the political sphere is intuitively appealing and, 
given the mainstreaming of political violence today, Arendt’s text may appear to be an obvious 
resource for contemporary critiques.1 In the following, I present reasons for resisting this temptation 
and identify the ways in which her critique of violence is complicit with the violent logic of a different 
order. I begin by reconstructing elements of Benjamin’s critique, in part because the alternative to 
violence his text presents is quite similar to Arendt’s own in important ways. Both seek to identify a 
form of nonviolent and unmediated or non-instrumental action beyond the law, and a comparison of 
their texts proves mutually illuminating on this point. Despite this similarity, however, their texts are 
otherwise fundamentally opposed. Arendt never references Benjamin’s essay in On Violence or other 
works. It is possible she was unaware of it, but her critique is in some ways uncannily its opposite. 
Whereas Benjamin focuses his critique on the violence of the law and the state and seeks to identify 
forms of dissident action that could (and should) undermine both, Arendt focuses her critique on 
dissident action, particularly that of the Black Power movement, leaving legal and state violence 
presumed, but untheorized. That presumption was precisely the target (and starting point) of 
Benjamin’s essay, and thus we find that his central thesis concerning the violence of law has critical 
traction against Arendt’s argument. 
Having reconstructed relevant components of Benjamin’s argument, I turn to Arendt’s critique of 
political violence, first outlining her distinctions between the political, social, and private spheres, 
which are explicit in other works, but operate only implicitly in On Violence. This enables us to identify 
how the divisions and exclusions in Arendt’s text allow her to explicitly disavow violence on one level 
while implicitly relying on a constitutive and racialized form of violence on another. Any contemporary 
analysis that incorporates Arendt’s critique of violence is, I argue, susceptible to also reproducing her 
pernicious racial politics, which neglect state (and white vigilante) violence while charging those who 
resist it with breaching the peace. The following is thus intended as a cautionary tale.  
 
Benjamin and the Violence of the Law 
Benjamin and Arendt developed a close friendship in the 1930s, during their time together in Paris 
with other German émigrés, including Arendt’s future husband, Heinrich Blücher (Young-Bruehl 115-
63). Blücher had participated in the Sparticist Uprising of 1919 in Berlin (Eiland and Jennings 580-
81), which was intentionally undermined by the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The SPD collaborated 
with elements of the German bourgeoisie, military command, and right-wing paramilitary Freikorps 
throughout the German Revolution. It was a calculated strategy to solidify SPD rule in the new Weimar 
Republic and to prevent the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) from turning an uprising into a 
communist revolution. This betrayal of the revolutionary moment soured Benjamin—and others like 
Herbert Marcuse, a member of a Leftist civilian security force in Berlin at the time (Kellner 14-18)—on 
both the SPD and Weimar’s parliamentary republic system.  
In his now famous essay “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin described parliaments, including 
Germany’s at the time, as falling into decay because they had forgotten that they “represent a 
lawmaking violence” and that it was a revolutionary force that brought them into existence (244). In a 
tone haunted by the exterminating violence soon to come—and admired at the time by fascist jurist 
                                                 
1 In the United States, a major political party is giving ideological support to the proliferation of fascist street 
gangs. The National Rifle Association recently declared that academic, political, and media “elites” are America’s 
greatest domestic threats, fueling a tactical turn in American gun culture that equates freedom with firearms and 
encourages military-style training in preparation for a civil war. The President of the United States repeatedly 
encourages violence against journalists and political opponents and has explicitly directed the police to exercise 
more violence against suspects. Similar trends in the normalization of political violence are evident in recent 
authoritarian movements around the globe. 
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Carl Schmitt—Benjamin claimed that it was little wonder parliaments “cannot achieve decrees worthy 
of this violence, but cultivate in compromise a supposedly nonviolent manner of dealing with political 
affairs” (244). Benjamin did not, however, intend for his critique of the “supposedly nonviolent 
manner” of law to contribute to the establishment of a more suitable parliament. His intention was 
rather to comprehend a kind of non-instrumental violence that could undo law and thus the state—an 
anarchical vision quite different from the statist dreams of German conservatives and fascists like 
Schmitt (Derrida 281-82). Benjamin’s messianic term for this exceptional possibility is “divine 
violence.”  
In “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin’s focus on the relation of violence to law and justice involved a 
shift away from the (justificatory) question of ends and toward the more radical question of whether 
violence could ever be an appropriate means. As a radical critique, it was directed straight at the 
principle of violence itself—the “violence-laden character of the law,” as Marcuse called it (124)—
regardless of the ends it serves. His project was therefore not to determine the normative constraints 
of violence within a legal order, but to address the question of whether violence, as a principle, was 
ever justified (“Critique” 236). He concluded that it could not be. Because both the positing of law and 
its enforcement are pernicious—insofar as violence is “necessarily and intimately bound to it” (248)—
Benjamin reasoned that the legal order itself must be transcended and this could only be done 
through the “pure means [reines Mittel]” of divine violence.  
Influenced by the revolutionary moment of 1919 and Georges Sorel’s Reflections on Violence 
(1908), the only candidate Benjamin believed could qualify as non-instrumental violence is the labor 
strike. Not every strike does, however. Indeed, strikes are often used for what Benjamin describes as 
a means of extortion, that is to achieve some goal concerning pay, benefits, or working conditions. In 
these cases, which are most common, the strike takes on an instrumental or “political” form (239). 
However, when a strike becomes revolutionary, as the general strike in Berlin in 1919 threatened to 
become, it exceeds instrumentality and become a “pure means.” Benjamin claims that the task of this 
general or revolutionary strike is the destruction of state power, not the establishment of law (246).2 
This exceptional, non-instrumental kind of violence had, according to Benjamin, the potential to 
negate legal violence altogether and thus make possible justice. Werner Hamacher summarizes 
Benjamin’s point this way: “Politics and violence can be termed pure only if they manifest a form of 
justice, untainted by the interests of preserving or mandating certain ways of life, untainted by 
positive forms of law” (1133). There are two different moments being described here. The first is the 
negation or overcoming of legal violence through the pure means of the revolutionary strike, which in 
a sense clear out the violent instrumentality structuring social relations. The second moment concerns 
how the dissolution of the state and legal order affords the possibility of a generalized nonviolent 
politics or sociality. Here, Benjamin entertained the possibility of a politics of pure, nonviolent means, 
which cultivated communicative virtues and resolved conflicts “beyond all legal systems and therefore 
beyond violence” (247). The possibility of the latter, Benjamin argues, can be located in an already 
existing “sphere of human agreement that is nonviolent to the extent that it is wholly inaccessible to 
violence: the proper sphere of ‘understanding,’ language” (245). 3  Although this non-instrumental 
option is strengthened through the cultivation of certain subjective preconditions, such as “courtesy, 
sympathy, peaceableness, trust” (244), one need not be motivated by such virtues. The concern that 
violent conflict would be too costly, says Benjamin, is sufficient to move even the most reluctant. He 
uses the example of diplomats who rarely utilize legal contracts, relying instead on private and 
                                                 
2 Benjamin has characterized this as the blasting open of the continuum of history in his “Theses on the Philosophy 
of History” (1940) through revolutionary violence described as “pure immediate violence” (“Critique” 252). It is a 
kind of deposing (Entsetzung) or what Werner Hamacher describes as afformation. “On the breaking 
[Durchbrechung] of this cycle maintained by mythic forms of law, on the suspension [Entsetzung] of law with all 
the forces on which it depends as they depend on it,” writes Benjamin, “finally therefore on the abolition of state 
power [Staatsgewalt], a new historical epoch is founded” (251-52). On Hamacher’s reading, the suspension or 
afformative moment is, for Benjamin, not a performance or a counter-positing of the law, but rather a kind of 
“absolute precondition of every historical positing violence” (1139, fn12). 
3 For Benjamin, language is evidence of a nonviolent form of sociality and is thus be invoked as support for a 
radical critique of violence. It is a “pure means,” writes Derrida, in which “the means/ends relation is suspended,” 
and therefore demonstrates that “the non-violent elimination of conflicts is possible in the private world when it is 
ruled by the culture of the heart, cordial courtesy, sympathy, love of peace, trust, friendship” (284). In this world, 
social coordination is carried out by agreement, not contract, and the instrumental mechanisms of the state play no 
part. Language for Benjamin is thus, writes Daniel Loick, a “sphere that simultaneously guarantees and anticipates 
the possibility of a world beyond the law” (223). For an elaboration on this possible world, see Loick, A Critique of 
Sovereignty 210-216. 
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delicately negotiated informal agreements. This is an example of what Jürgen Habermas would call 
communicative, as opposed to instrumental, action. 4  Language, as a pure means of capable of 
governing “peaceful intercourse between private persons” (245) is thus analogous to the pure means 
of the general strike, which can suspend the legal order. 
Although I discuss Arendt’s notion of power at greater length momentarily, it is useful to note here 
that Benjamin’s idea of language as being “wholly inaccessible to violence” and capable of cultivating 
mutual understanding without coercion is echoed in Arendt’s notion of power as generated by non-
instrumental speaking and acting in concert. She calls it the “force of mutual promise” (Human 
Condition 245). It is this power that Arendt proffers as an alternative to violence in the political 
sphere. Jürgen Habermas, whose own theory of communicative action can be situated in this tradition, 
argues that Arendt’s notion of power—and by extension Benjamin’s notion of language as pure 
means—is based on interlocutors using language “for the noncoercive establishment of intersubjective 
relations” or illocutionarily, rather than as “to instigate other subjects to a desired behavior” or 
perlocutionarily (“Hannah Arendt” 6; also Habermas “Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive 
Criticism”).5  
Benjamin’s text was first anthologized in 1955 in a volume edited by Theodor and Gretel Adorno, 
and again ten years later in a collection edited by Herbert Marcuse, this time prominently featured in 
the collection’s title: Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze (The Critique of Violence and Other 
Essays). Despite the interest in Benjamin’s text in the 1950s and 1960s, it failed to appear in the first 
English anthology of his work, Illuminations (1968), edited by Arendt. It was not until the publication 
of the collection Reflections (1978), edited by Peter Demetz, that Benjamin’s text was made available 
in English.  
 
Violence and the Policing of Distinctions 
Long before the publication of On Violence in 1970, Arendt was engaged in the study of violence in the 
contexts of war, revolution, imperialism, and the relations of the private and social spheres. These 
earlier studies were critical in the Kantian sense of critique, namely, identifying distinctions and 
enforcing them, rather than rejecting a principle or practice in toto. As Kant claimed in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, the utility of critique is analogous to that of the police: it secures order and defends 
proper boundaries, rather than building something new (e.g. doctrine). To deny the importance of this 
function, Kant argues, “would be as much as to say that the police are of no positive utility because 
their chief business is to put a stop to the violence that citizens have to fear from other citizens, so 
that each can carry on his own affairs in peace and safety” (115; also Arendt Lectures on Kant’s 31-
35).6  
Arendt’s entire body of work is engaged in identifying and policing boundaries. She often defends 
the importance of making distinctions in the face of what she describes as the tendency to believe 
“everything can eventually be called anything else” (“What is Authority?” 95). In On Violence, she 
describes the failure to distinguish concepts, such as power, strength, force, violence, and authority as 
a “sad reflection on the present state of political science” (43). Her published reply to a review of two 
of her books in the New York Review of Books is titled “Distinctions,” because she felt the reviewer 
failed to draw enough of them (“Distinctions”). Even her conception of human flourishing, most 
explicitly articulated in The Human Condition, culminates in individuals disclosing themselves as 
“distinct and unique persons” (183), i.e. clearly distinguishing themselves from others. We can also 
detect this method at work in her description of Benjamin as a theorist: Her longest analysis of 
Benjamin appears as the introduction to Illuminations, which Arendt begins by explaining why it is so 
difficult to clearly categorize his work and notes that it was rare for Benjamin to “define what he was 
doing” (“Walter Benjamin” 4). Her general response to what she saw as the vagaries haunting both 
                                                 
4  For Habermas, different social actors can coordinate their action plans by violent means or through the 
“illocutionary forces of speech.” When the latter reign, language acts as the “primary source of social integration” 
and then one can speak of “communicative action” (Between Facts and Norms 17-18). 
5  We can also view these non-instrumental intersubjective relations as primordial. Benjamin uses dialogue 
(Unterredung), which generates mutual understanding (Übereinkunft), as an example of pure mediacy or, as 
Hamacher describes it, “the condition of possibility of instrumental language” (“Afformative, Strike” 1141). Arendt 
will characterize the noncoercive and intersubjective nature of power as “the very condition enabling a group of 
people to think and act in terms of the means-end category” (On Violence 51). 
6  For Kant, the boundaries of speculative reason needed to be identified and enforced, so we could exercise 
practical reason without fear of transgression (Critique of Pure Reason 114). 
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theory and practice was to structure her texts around the particular distinctions and the Weberian 
ideal types she believed were in urgent need of clarification.  
Arendt viewed this method of making distinctions and stipulating definitions as essentially 
Aristotelian. In a rare reflection on method, she writes: “I always start anything by saying, ‘A and B 
are not the same.’ And this, of course, comes right out of Aristotle” (“On Hannah Arendt” 338). This 
comment was prompted by Mary McCarthy’s characterization of her as exhibiting “a medieval habit of 
thought” (Arendt “On Hannah Arendt” 337), but given the explicit policing function of her theorizing, 
the above association with Kant is more appropriate. Jacques Rancière refers to Arendt’s method as 
the partitioning or distributing of the sensible “le partage du sensible” (36) and more specifically to 
her categorical separation of the social and political spheres as the “logic of the police” (206). 
In works such as The Human Condition, the question of violence, for Arendt, is not whether it 
should exist in contemporary life, but rather where it is appropriate. Indeed, she views violence as 
both necessary and enabling of the emergence of a republican political sphere in which individuals can 
participate nonviolently and as equals. Once such distinctions have been made, the boundaries 
between the various forms of practical life—what Arendt refers to as the vita activa—can be properly 
maintained. Understanding how Arendt identifies the boundaries between the political, social, and 
private spheres of the vita activa helps us identify why she claims that violence in both the social and 
private spheres simultaneously enables, yet is prohibited from, the political realm. Once we illuminate 
her distinctions, we can identify how, despite Arendt’s efforts to elide the role of state violence in the 
political sphere (On Revolution 9), such violence remains central—not only to the origin of the political 
realm, but also to its maintenance and the formation of the individuals Arendt so poetically eulogizes.  
Arendt’s historical narrative of the emergence of distinct social spheres with their own particular 
relations, activities, and objectives is one of slow degeneration over the centuries, yet she recounts it 
with a sense of political urgency. Using ancient Greece as her model, Arendt begins with a dualistic 
model in which there are two distinct realms of life: the private household, which is the sphere of 
labor, material needs, and unequal relations of rule, and the political sphere, which is the realm of 
freedom and equality. One of the distinctive characteristics of modernity is the emergence of a third 
sphere, the “social,” which is a sphere of work that is neither public nor private and thus blurs the 
boundary between the two: “In the modern world, the two realms indeed constantly flow into each 
other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself” (Human Condition 33). This is 
the sphere of socialized production, which moves production out of the household, and “mass society”, 
which mitigates individualization. When mass society has “devoured all strata of the nation,” says 
Arendt, conformism rules and renders distinction and difference merely “private matters” (Human 
Condition 45, 41; also The Origins 407-32).  
Given Arendt’s commitments to clear boundaries, to individual freedom, and to the ability to 
distinguish oneself in the public realm through such freedom, the encroachment of the social into the 
political sphere represents a triple threat. It threatens to (a) turn the political sphere into a means 
rather than an end, which (b) undermines the conditions of freedom, and exerts a downward 
equalizing force that (c) contributes to massification rather than individual distinction: “the victory of 
equality in the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has 
conquered the public realm” (Human Condition 33; also “What is Freedom?” 155). Arendt relatedly 
argues in her “Reflections on Little Rock” (1959) that equality of opportunity in education through 
school integration is a dangerous step toward a mass society insofar as it undermines social 
hierarchies, which, in the context school integration are, one must conclude, racial hierarchies. “Mass 
society—which blurs lines of discrimination and levels group distinctions—is a danger to society as 
such,” she writes (51). It is little wonder that this essay was controversial at the time, even leading to 
a yearlong delay in its publication. It was intended for the magazine Commentary, which 
commissioned it, but their alarm and hesitation about publishing it eventually caused Arendt to 
withdraw it (Young-Bruehl 308-18). A year later Dissent decided to publish it, albeit with a disclaimer: 
“We publish it not because we agree with it—quite the contrary!—but because we believe in freedom 
of expression even for views that seem to us entirely mistaken” (“Reflections” 45). 
In Arendt’s theory, labor (private), work (social), and action (political) are the three categories of 
the active life (vita activa), which determine proper social relations and indicate whether or not 
violence and inequality is acceptable. Arendt argues that the political is the only sphere in which the 
individual can become distinct and yet exercise freedom as an equal. It is also the only sphere in 
which violence is antithetical to its specific form of vita activa. In On Revolution and The Human 
Condition, the sphere of politics is the exemplification of non-violent social coordination, whereas in 
the private and social spheres violence is considered natural. The near exclusion of violence from the 
political realm is an explicit rejection of Max Weber’s argument in “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) that 
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politics is a social relation of domination predicated on violence (On Violence 35-36). Such violence is, 
she writes, only appropriate to those forms of rule found in the private sphere, i.e. “home and family 
life, where the household head ruled with uncontested, despotic powers,” and is a characteristic of 
labor in the private sphere and work in the social sphere. When the private and public spheres fail to 
retain a clear boundary, as happens in authoritarian regimes, state despotism can also be “likened to 
the organization of the household” (Human Condition 27). 
Arendt refers to the violence of the private and social spheres as “prepolitical,” rather than non-
political, because she sees them as necessary conditions for the emergence of the political and thus of 
freedom. “Because all human beings are subject to necessity,” she writes, “they are entitled to 
violence toward others; violence is the prepolitical act of liberating oneself from the necessity of life 
for the freedom of world” (Human Condition 31). By “necessity of life,” Arendt is referring to the 
conditions necessary for the maintenance of biological life and health. The household (oikia) is a 
private sphere, in which we labor for the satisfaction of need and we are, in this condition, what she 
calls animal laborans. When Arendt speaks of overcoming the necessary labor of the private sphere, 
she does not mean that we somehow transcend biological needs, but rather that we are able to 
compel others to do the labor necessary to satisfy our needs. One can therefore be liberated from 
labor, but this liberation entails social domination or, historically speaking, mastery over the labor of 
women, children, paid workers, and unpaid slaves. In the context of ancient Greece, with which 
Arendt begins her narrative, her focus is on slave labor: “force and violence are justified in this sphere 
because they are the only means to master necessity—for instance, by ruling over slaves—and to 
become free” (Human Condition 31). The private sphere is thus a place of fundamental inequality and 
unfreedom, which Arendt claims is a precondition for the fundamental equality and freedom of the 
political sphere. 
This constitutive relation of the private and political is not, however, limited to the ancient world. In 
her critique of school desegregation in the U.S., for example, Arendt makes clear that equality should 
be limited to the political sphere and not sought in the private or social realms, the latter being the 
site of public education: “For equality not only has its origin in the body politic; its validity is clearly 
restricted to the political realm” (“Reflections” 50). Indeed, Arendt describes the discrimination in the 
social sphere, which includes racial discrimination in public educational institutions, as a “social right” 
grounded in the freedom of association, whereas equality is only a political right (“Reflections” 51). 
Arendt asserts that she is against legally enforced segregation, but not the “social custom” of 
segregation (49). Racial discrimination exercised by individuals and non-state organizations should 
therefore be protected, she concludes. “The question,” writes Arendt, “is not how to abolish 
discrimination, but how to keep it confined within the social sphere, where it is legitimate, and prevent 
its trespassing on the political and the personal sphere, where it is destructive” (51). It was a classic 
example of critique as policing boundaries, but one that evidenced how categorical distinctions could 
become complicit with the perpetuation of racialized violence and inequality. 
In addition to the violence used as a means to compel others to carry out the labor necessary to 
satisfy needs—namely, the violence of social domination—Arendt also describes labor and work as 
forms of violence. The labor of the private sphere involves killing, destroying, interrupting, and in the 
case of minerals and stone, tearing them “out of the womb of the earth” (Human Condition 139). Such 
violence enacted against objects (as opposed to subjects) is even more pronounced in the work of the 
social sphere (homo faber), which fabricates semi-permanent objects for use, including the physical 
infrastructure that supports the political sphere. Moreover, all workmanship harbors “an element of 
violence” (Human Condition 130). Significantly, Arendt argues that the violence of work contributes to 
subject formation in ways that would seemingly prepare one for successful participation in the political 
sphere: “The experience of this violence [of work] is the most elemental experience of human 
strength and, therefore, the very opposite of the painful, exhausting effort experienced in sheer labor. 
It can provide self-assurance and satisfaction, and can even become a source of self-confidence 
throughout life” (Human Condition 140). In her earlier work, Arendt thus identifies three positive 
effects of violence: its effect on others (coercion), on objects (transformation), and on the self 
(confidence). None of these acceptable effects are, however, discussed in On Violence.7  
                                                 
7 Arendt’s account of self-confidence reminds one of Hegel’s narrative of the bondsman, who is denied recognition 
by the lord, but realizes “it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he 
acquires a mind of his own” (119). It falls short of the social condition of mutual recognition, but is a reflection of 
the bondsman’s previous unacknowledged capacity for negation and the comprehension of this is a constitutive 
moment in the development of self-consciousness. Indeed, Arendt’s three acceptable forms of violence are all 
similarly constructive forms of negation in Hegel’s account, which influenced Sartre and Fanon. 
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Arendt’s positive assessment of the effects of violence on subject formation is particularly 
surprising, however, given her later critique of Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre in On Violence for 
asserting that violence can have precisely such a desirable and transformative quality. Fanon, for 
example, famously described decolonial violence as contributing to a psychological sense of 
empowerment and confidence, similar to that noted by Arendt: “It rids the colonized of their inferiority 
complex, of their passive and despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-
confidence” (51). And it was this effect, and not just the protection of biological life, which inspired 
many in the Black Power movement in the United States (Kautzer “Notes”). I return to Arendt’s 
critique of this view—often referred to today as the decolonization of consciousness—after addressing 
her model of the political sphere as nonviolent. 
Again, as a sphere of freedom, the political realm is free not only from need, but also from the 
kinds of violence proper to other spheres: the violence of social domination as well as that of labor 
and work. Most importantly, the strategic nature of violence is incompatible with the power that keeps 
the political realm in existence (Human Condition 199). Indeed, Arendt argues, they are opposites (On 
Violence 56). Throughout history, according to Arendt, most political theorists have failed to properly 
distinguish power and violence, a distinction she sketches in detail in The Human Condition (22-78; 
199-207). The fact that she reproduces this account at length in On Violence (35-56), demonstrates 
its importance to her critique of decolonial thought and the Black Power movement and her belief that, 
despite their success in the civil rights and anti-war movements, “the adherents of nonviolence are on 
the defensive” (14). 
 
Power, the Political, and the Exception to Nonviolence 
Power relates to our ability to act in concert, says Arendt. It is therefore located not within the 
individual, but in the relations among individuals, i.e. in the group, and when the group disbands so 
too does this power (On Violence 44). In The Human Condition, she refers to the space in which this 
acting and speaking in concert is made possible as the “space of appearance” (199). “In acting and 
speaking,” Arendt writes, “men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world” (179). This form of publicity allows us to make 
ourselves known to each other as individuals and thus to obtain social recognition. It is the basis of 
the polis, which also acts as “a kind of organized remembrance” (198).8 The power generated within 
this polis is, Arendt argues, the potestas in populo or the power of the people necessary for 
government. Because it is “inherent in the very existence of political communities,” she writes, this 
power needs no justification. Unlike violence, which is essentially instrumental, power is an end in 
itself (On Violence 51). The government and the rule of law are, according to Arendt, materializations 
of this nonviolent power of the people, so when “the living power of the people ceases to uphold 
them,” state institutions “petrify and decay” (On Violence 40-1).  
Benjamin made nearly the opposite point in his “Critique of Violence,” arguing that parliaments 
relied on the violence, rather than power, that brought them into being and that maintained them: 
“When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears the 
institution falls into decay” (244). Indeed, Benjamin issued a warning against the mistaken belief that 
existing political affairs are actually dealt with in a “nonviolent manner” (244). For him, all law-making 
and all law-preserving action, as well as all productions and enforcements of legal contracts, preserve 
the “latent presence” of violence or explicitly exercise it. The solution to violence was not therefore a 
better government or more just law: “however desirable and gratifying a flourishing parliament might 
be by comparison, a discussion of means of political agreement that are in principle nonviolent cannot 
be concerned with parliamentarianism,” writes Benjamin. “For what a parliament achieves in vital 
affairs can be only those legal decrees that in their origin and outcome are attended by violence” 
(244). 
Arendt emphatically argues that nonviolent action is the vita activa of the political sphere, whereas 
work and labor—as instrumental and violent—characterize the social and private spheres respectively. 
It is power, as an “end in itself,” that takes center stage in the political sphere, with violence excluded 
to the extent that Arendt does not consider the instrumentality of state action and legal violence. In 
this, Arendt is following Kant, not only in the aforementioned method of critique as policing 
boundaries, but in what she takes to be Kant’s understanding of political action as well: “Kant did not 
mean to formulate or conceptualize the tenets of the utilitarianism of his time, but on the contrary 
                                                 
8 According to Arendt, one of the most dissatisfying elements of the sphere of labor is that human activity “left no 
trace, no monument, no great work worthy of remembrance” (Human Condition 81). 
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wanted first of all to relegate the means-end category to its proper place and prevent its use in the 
field of political action” (Human Condition 156).  
This understanding of the political sphere as largely non-violent and of political action as non-
instrumental is rather remarkable when judged by Arendt’s own method. The political is not defined by 
acts of governing, lawmaking, or positing rights, which are more or less absent from other spheres of 
practical activity (vita activa) and thus make them logical candidates for drawing clear distinctions. 
Unlike in Benjamin’s critique, Arendt does not consider the overcoming of violence to be a condition 
for the presence of justice. Sheldon Wolin argues that this silence concerning justice is directly related 
to another “extraordinary omission” in Arendt’s theory, namely, the state. “That one could claim to 
have a politics without discussing the state is perhaps the result of her Greek starting-point” (296). 
While it is true that Arendt’s classifications reflect her attention to ancient Greece, it is her attempt to 
represent complex human relations and institutions with one form of practical activity (e.g. labor, 
work, action) that leads her to confounding conclusions. She not only excludes the coercive powers of 
the state—from its legal order to the exercise of its military violence—from the political, but does not 
account for such violence in any other sphere either. The state, which Wolin rightly refers to as the 
“greatest concentration of coercive power in history” (296), is almost entirely banished to the 
interstices of Arendt’s categories.  
We saw that the structure of Arendt’s theory forefronts three fundamental types of human activity 
(i.e. the vita activa). These types are, in ascending order of importance, labor, work, and action, and 
each corresponds to “one of the basic conditions under which life on earth was given to man” (Human 
Condition 7). Arendt’s focus on the importance of these human activities for understanding the 
“human condition” is a corrective to what she considers a problematic prioritization of the vita 
contemplativa in the history of philosophical thought. In addition to this elevation of the importance of 
the vita activa over contemplation, her work is, as we have seen, also motivated by a desire to clarify 
what she views as the “blurred… distinctions and articulations within the vita activa itself” (17).  
Arendt has thus defined the human condition through four fundamental ways of being in the 
world—contemplation (theōria), labor, work, and action—none of which capture the violence of war, 
revolution, law enforcement, punishment, colonialism, slavery, state and sub-state terrorism, 
vigilantism, domestic violence, or the defensive violence practiced by individuals and communities 
against these. Whether the prevalence and profound influence of such violence in our lives, past and 
present, should make it worthy of its own category in an account of the human condition is not a 
question I entertain here. It is clear, however, that this tripartite model simply cannot accommodate 
the above forms of violence, so something has to give. 
Arendt’s unsatisfying solution to this problem is to introduce state violence as an exception. In a 
parenthetical remark, she concedes that instrumental activities such as governing and lawmaking (i.e. 
the forms of rule that Weber highlighted as involving violence) do in fact also take place in the political 
sphere: “This is, of course, not to deny that governments pursue policies and employ their power to 
achieve prescribed goals,” she writes (On Violence 51). However, no proposal is made for how we are 
to reconcile this claim with her previous assertions that exclude just this kind of instrumentality. In the 
rare moments when Arendt acknowledges state violence in the political sphere, it is cast in terms of 
the “last resort” (On Violence 47, 51, 63). It is only appropriately exercised against a criminal, rebel, 
or foreign enemy, she argues and can only be used to “keep the power structure intact” (On Violence 
47). For Arendt, violence in the political sphere is thus construed as unusual, not foundational. It is 
evidence of a breakdown in proper relations, and its exceptional use is only justified when it serves to 
uphold the power structure: “Violence appears where power is in jeopardy” (On Violence 56). 
Benjamin would agree that these are examples of instrumental violence, although add that such 
violence is not exceptional, but latent in the law itself. 
Beyond the problem that state and legal violence pose for Arendt’s distinctions, the non-
instrumental power said to define the political sphere is arguably also present in the social and private 
spheres as well. Because justice is not the goal of action, according to Arendt, one can imagine the 
power of speaking and acting in concert characterizing religious practices, collaborative projects in civil 
society, as well as song, dance, theater, and storytelling. It is not clear where to situate these 
activities in Arendt’s vita activa model. 
These categories (or activities) serve in part as the normative ground of Arendt’s critique—they 
have “normative content” (Habermas 7)—determining whether and to what degree inequality, 
discrimination, and violence are acceptable in a particular sphere of life. Arendt describes both labor 
and work as inherently instrumental and violent toward the world of objects, and thus it follows that 
such violence, which serves as the normative ground of her critique, need not be justified. Although 
Arendt does not discuss this in On Violence, she has also argued in The Human Condition that coercion 
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and violence toward subjects (and not just objects) are justified when used to exit the private sphere 
of necessity and participate in the political realm of freedom. As Robert Bernasconi concludes, “it 
would seem that one of the preconditions of being human is the inhumanity of exploiting the labor of 
others” (“The Double Face” 6; also Arendt, Human Condition 119-20; On Revolution 110). The political 
is therefore dependent upon, but prioritized over, the private and social spheres. Finally, inequality 
and discrimination are, according to Arendt, acceptable in both the private and the social spheres, but 
not in the political sphere, where speaking and acting among equals is the non-coercive means for 
revealing oneself and receiving recognition within a heterogeneous community.  
 
Racial Violence and the Political Sphere 
Arendt’s ad hoc approach to theorizing violence in the political sphere in On Violence is more than 
simply dissatisfying by the standards of theory construction. It obfuscates the ways in which violence 
is inextricably bound to the political sphere. These include (a) the way violence is involved in subject 
formation and (b) how it serves as a means of overcoming necessity in order to gain entry into the 
political realm. As we have seen, neither of these is represented by Arendt’s categories of action or 
power, which points toward a normative gap in her analysis: If power is an end in itself and action is 
the non-coercive activity serving as the source of normativity, neither state violence nor resistance to 
it can be justified by appealing to power or the vita activa of the political sphere. 
Concerning subject formation, although Arendt did parenthetically concede in The Human Condition 
that the violence of workmanship “can even become a source of self-confidence” (140), she otherwise 
treats violence as an external means. It is conceptualized as an instrument to “multiply natural 
strength” (On Violence 46) rather than playing, as Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings write, a 
“structuring role in the ways individual and collective actors are produced and reproduced in both 
private and public domains of power” (104-05).9 Arendtian politics therefore “remains haunted by the 
violence it supposedly excludes” (94) and inconsistent insofar as it rejects the positive effect of 
violence on subject formation when espoused by those, such as Fanon and Sartre, who advocate 
resistance (On Violence 11-13). 
Concerning the overcoming of necessity, such an achievement entails relations of social domination 
and an unequal distribution of risk, responsibility, and toil. These are social structures or informal 
relations of rule that afford some, argues Arendt, the leisure for political action among peers. These 
relations of rule are reproduced through hierarchical cultural norms and coercive measures by both 
state and sub-state agents. Arendt has, for example, likened state despotism to the “uncontested, 
despotic powers” of the head of household in the private sphere (Human Condition 27). One’s location 
within these relations of rule has implications for subject formation and, more specifically for our 
discussion here, racial formation. Such forms of rule produce groups structurally vulnerable to violence 
and are therefore always contested, which in turn necessitates continuous policing and coercion to 
sustain them (Kautzer, Radical Philosophy 105-34).  
It is not clear whether Arendt’s perspective on race influenced the structure of her theory or if the 
structure of her theory influenced her problematic views on race. What is clear, however, is that the 
divisions of her theoretical framework, including the categorical exclusion of violence from the political 
sphere (beyond exceptional circumstances), reinforce a strategy in On Violence to undermine 
justifications for Black resistance. The quotidian and spectacular violence of White rule (both within 
and beyond the state) is ignored, deemed reasonable, or characterized as defensive. Throughout her 
text, Arendt invalidates Black experiences, history, and epistemic authority, and neglects abundant 
evidence of life-defining racism throughout U.S. history and contemporary institutions. Ignoring this 
“racialized state violence and dominance,” writes Joy James, “allows Arendt to construct a theory of 
power that floats freely above a foundation mired in racially fashioned domination” (252). This free-
floating notion of power in turn serves as the normative ground for her critique of violent resistance. 
Moreover, the marginalization of violence in the service of White rule, and the categorical exclusion of 
violence from the vita activa, make any justification for resistance seemingly disappear. Arendt makes 
no mention of either the violent history of colonization, chattel slavery, and Jim Crow, or of the legacy 
of inequality and racist cultural norms they produced.10 She provides no account of the role white 
                                                 
9 Violence “is not, at the start, presumptively ‘outside’,” writes Judith Butler. “Violence and non-violence are not 
only strategies or tactics, but form the subject and become its constitutive possibilities” (165). 
10  Arendt discusses some of these topics in Origins of Totalitarianism, where she is keen to distinguish the 
imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from the centuries of European colonialism that 
preceded it. Arendt argues that racism only emerged in the late nineteenth century as a “powerful ideology of 
imperialist policies” (158), whereas a non-ideological and more innocuous “race thinking” marked the colonial 
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terrorism and militias had in shaping the conditions of Indigenous and Black political participation, 
wealth accumulation, and education, nor is there any recognition of the history of resistance to such 
White violence, from John Brown, Frederick Douglass, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, to Robert F. Williams, 
the American Indian Movement, the Brown Berets, and the Deacons for Defense and Justice. 
Arendt ignores the history and function of state-sanctioned violence in reproducing White 
domination—through its own institutions or by tolerating the racist violence of non-state agents—
making resistance to it appear as unprovoked. In turn, she views the violence of the state and White 
communities as defensive and thus justified. In On Violence, Arendt mocks “Negro demands” as “silly 
and outrageous,” claims “the Negro community moodily indulges” in “fantasies” (95), asserts that 
“black rage” is “irrational” (65), and describes accusations of a “police state” as “meaningless” (15). 
She describes Black Power activists as “glorifying violence” (12, 14, 19, 65, 71, 75, 83), or practicing 
“racism in reverse” (65), and, what is worse, hypocritically attempting to provoke a nonviolent state 
into becoming violent in order to prove its supposed violent nature (66). Arendt faults the “guilt 
feelings” of Whites (19; See also 95) for leading them to take the “irrational” claims of Black activists 
more seriously than the “disinterested and usually highly moral claims of the white rebels” (19). 
Arendt’s implicit assumption is that White violence has not been significant and there has not yet 
developed a racist ideology among Whites to support such violence. Indeed, the Black Power 
movement and Black community uprisings could, she writes, “provoke a really violent white backlash, 
whose greatest danger would be the transformation of white prejudices into a full-fledged racist 
ideology for which ‘law and order’ would indeed become a mere façade” (77). She made a similar 
claim in her New York Times Magazine article “Lawlessness Is Inherent in the Uprooted” (1968), 
wherein she warned that the “lawlessness” of the Black community was creating the real danger of “a 
white backlash” (24). In Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt argued that racism emerged in nineteenth-
century imperialism, not European colonization, but racism is not viewed by Arendt as a cynical 
justification for plunder, rape, enslavement, and murder. It was, she argues, rather the logical 
reaction of frightened, yet “civilized” European imperialists (185). In On Violence, she similarly argued 
that Black violence could ultimately push the White community to rationally endorse “the invisible 
terror of a police state for law and order in the streets” (77). 
While Arendt found talk of a police state among activists to be “meaningless,” the FBI’s 
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) was in full swing, harassing, imprisoning, and murdering 
activists. It was a secret police state that collaborated with the Chicago police in 1969 to assassinate 
Fred Hampton, chairman of the Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party—one year after J. Edgar 
Hoover described the Black Panther Party as the greatest domestic threat to U.S. national security 
(James 257). State violence was not, of course, limited to activists of color. The year On Violence was 
published, members of the Ohio National Guard opened fire on unarmed protestors at Kent State 
University, killing four white students (two of whom were simply walking to class) and wounding nine 
more.  
Although much more could be said about Arendt’s views on race and racism generally such 
examples demonstrate how these views intersect with and influence her normative theorizing about 
                                                                                                                                                             
period. By coupling colonialism with race thinking and imperialism with racism, Arendt creates a theory with clear 
boundaries. However, like the one-to-one correlation of the vita activa to her tripartite sociological model, it led to 
some rather dubious claims. For example, Arendt concludes that slavery in the U.S. “did not make the slave-
holding peoples race-conscious before the nineteenth century” and that throughout the 1700s “slave-holders 
themselves considered it a temporary institution and wanted to abolish it gradually” (177). This move also 
absolved the entire European philosophical tradition from the charge of racism, a tradition that often theorized race 
and freedom in ways that lent philosophical legitimacy to colonialism, racial essentialism, white supremacy, and 
slavery. “Until the fateful days of the ‘scramble for Africa,’” writes Arendt, “race thinking had been one of the many 
free opinions which, within the general framework of liberalism, argued and fought each other to win the consent of 
public opinion” (159). As simply one opinion among others, she argues, the race thinking of philosophers “would 
hardly have been able to create or, for that matter, to degenerate into racism as a Weltanschauung or an ideology” 
(158). It was only when such opinions were taken up in the service of capitalist expansion abroad that they 
became pernicious. Moreover, Arendt claims such racism was a reasonable reaction, given the exposure of 
“Western humanity” to “new and shocking experiences” (183), i.e. encountering non-Europeans through 
imperialism.  Indeed, she writes that these experiences “necessitated the invention of racism” (184). Arendt makes 
a similar argument about the rise of anti-black racism (and violence) in White communities experiencing 
desegregation. Racism is thus simultaneously granted a logical and exceptional status in European history—
functionally similar to the status Arendt grants state violence in the U.S.—and thus not something that should be 
considered characteristic of an intellectual tradition. Indeed, Arendt goes so far as to assert that racism was 
incompatible with “all Western political and moral standards of the past” (184; also Bernasconi “When the Real 
Crime Began”; Moruzzi 86-113; Gines 77-92). 
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violence.11  Arendt’s systematic marginalization of state and sub-state White violence leave them 
without justification, while the relation of such violence to racial formation—i.e. the “existential 
significance of violence” (Frazer and Hutchings 91) that influenced the views of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Fanon, and many others in decolonial and Black Power struggles—remains undertheorized. 
Conversely, antiracist resistance that may involve violence is subjected to impassioned and sustained 
critique by Arendt and generally determined to be irrational, provocative, and—when judged by the 
normative standard of action and power—clearly unjustified. She even attempts to undermine the 
theoretical resources of New Left, decolonial, and Black Power movements by significantly (yet 
unpersuasively) downplaying the role of violence in Marx’s and G. W. F. Hegel’s understanding of 
revolution and social transformation (On Violence 11-14). This uneven treatment of violence, informed 
by her racialized evaluative framework and her choice of which activities to include in the vita activa, 
works to conceal and insulate the violence of the state and White rule. 
 
Conclusion 
Arendt’s critique of violence seeks to enforce the norms of the vita activa in the private, social, and 
political spheres and thus, unlike Benjamin’s project, determine when and in which spheres violence 
by individuals is justified. None of the activities constituting the vita activa, however, involves the 
positing of law, nor can any of them provide normative support for the state violence employed in law 
enforcement—two central concerns for Benjamin. The laws of the political sphere, Arendt writes, “are 
the positively established fences which hedge in, protect, and limit the space in which freedom is… a 
living, political reality” (“Karl Jaspers” 81-2). This nonviolent, communicative space is supposed to 
enable one to engage in public affairs amongst equals and develop excellence or virtuosity (aretē), 
even when inequality, segregation, and discrimination are rampant and, according to Arendt, justified 
in the social sphere. As Habermas has noted, it is curious that Arendt’s version of democracy “inhibits 
its liberating efficacy just at the boundaries where political oppression ceases and social repression 
begins” (“Hannah Arendt’s” 15).12 Citing Thucydides, Arendt argues that the political must remain 
nonviolent, but beyond its walls “the strong did what they could, and the weak suffered what they 
must” (On Revolution 12).  
From a biographical perspective, Arendt’s tendency to shift the site of violence away from 
republican state institutions and onto these forms of dissent could be attributable in part to her first-
hand experience with seeking refuge from the brutal violence of fascism. This may have contributed to 
Arendt’s hesitation to critique the republican form of government within which she eventually found 
security. Her admiration for the U.S. republic and her idealized version of the American Revolution 
(and its revolutionaries)—which Elisabeth Young-Bruehl aptly refers to as a “political fable” (403)—are 
evident throughout On Revolution. Relatedly, Robert Bernasconi argues that “the extraordinary weight 
Arendt gave to maintaining the distinctness of the political was not simply a consequence of her 
championing of Greek ideas” but was “derived from her own experience of statelessness” (“The 
Double Face” 7). These were experiences not yet known to Benjamin when he penned his critique of 
the Weimar Republic in “Critique of Violence.”  
Setting aside the question of motivation, it is difficult to avoid concluding that Arendt simply held 
contradictory positions and that the normative content of the vita activa was selectively applied in 
order to conceal or absolve some forms of violence while denouncing others. Arendt’s commitment to 
non-sovereign freedom (see “What is Freedom?”) arguably aligned her with the voices of dissent in 
her time—particularly given her positive comments about council democracy (see Sitton, “Hannah 
Arendt’s”). However, her response to antiracist and decolonial movements was either condescension 
or silence. This renders her critique complicit with the more reactionary political tendencies of her time 
and provides us with a poignant example of the ways in which a critique of violence can turn into its 
opposite. 
 
                                                 
11 For a book-length treatment, see Katherine Gines, Arendt and the Negro Question. Other excellent studies 
include Bernasconi and Norton. 
12 One wonders how equality in the polis could prevent members of a community marred by social inequality and 
domination from viewing racialized others as deficient, dangerous, or immoral and thus never recognizing their 
actions as rising to the level of excellence? How can one’s actions become part of history when any record or 
artifact of them are purged from the history books or smashed to dust? We know the heroic deeds of women and 
people of color—even when enjoying formal equality—are often swept into oblivion “without any more significance 
than slicing through a head of cabbage or than a gulp of water” (360), as Hegel would say. In their place are 
erected statues of rapists, slave owners, Confederate generals, and white supremacist politicians, whose only aretē 
was to enact and defend forms of racial domination and terror. 
Chad Kautzer, "Political Violence and Race: A Critique of Hannah Arendt"    page 12 of 12 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.3 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol21/iss3/8> 
Special Issue On Complicity and Dissent. Ed. Nitzan Lebovic 
 
Works cited 
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Meridian Books, 1962. 
---. The Human Condition. Chicago UP, 1958. 
---. “Reflections on Little Rock.” Dissent, vol. 6, no. 1, 1959, pp. 45-56. 
---. “What is Authority?” Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought, Viking Press, 1961, pp. 91-
141.  
---. On Revolution. Viking Press, 1963. 
---. “Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940.” Illuminations. Translated by Harry Zohn, Schocken Books, 1968, pp. 1-55. 
---. “Is America by Nature a Violent Society? Lawlessness Is Inherent in the Uprooted.” New York Times Magazine, 
28 April 1968, p. 24. 
---. On Violence. Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970. 
---. “Distinctions.” New York Review of Books, issue 13, 1 January 1970, p. 36. 
---. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, edited by Ronald Beiner, Chicago UP, 1982. 
---. “Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?.” Men in Dark Times, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955, pp. 81-94. 
---. “What is Freedom?” Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Viking Press, 1968. 
---. “On Hannah Arendt.” Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, edited by Melvyn A. Hill, St. Martin’s 
Press, 1979, pp. 301-39. 
Benjamin, Walter. Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze. Edited by Herbert Marcuse, Suhrkamp, 1965. 
---. “Critique of Violence.” Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926, Harvard UP, 1996, pp. 236-
52. 
Bernasconi, Robert. “The Double Face of the Political and the Social: Hannah Arendt and America’s Racial 
Divisions.” Research in Phenomenology, no. 26, 1996, pp. 3–24. 
---. “The Invisibility of Racial Minorities in the Public Realm of Appearances.” Phenomenology of the Political, edited 
by Kevin Thompson and Lester Embree, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 169-187. 
---. “When the Real Crime Began: Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism and the Dignity of the Western 
Philosophical Tradition.” Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide, 
edited by Richard King and Dan Stone, Berghahn, 2007, pp. 54-67. 
Butler, Judith. “The Claim of Non-Violence.” Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, Verso, 2009, pp. 165-84. 
Derrida, Jacques. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’.” Acts of Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar. 
Routledge, 2001, pp. 228-98. 
Eiland, Howard and Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life. Harvard UP, 2014. 
Fanon, Frantz. Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox, Grove Press, 2004. 
Frazer, Elizabeth and Hutchings, Kimberly. “On Politics and Violence: Arendt contra Fanon.” Contemporary Political 
Theory vol. 7, no. 1, 2008, pp. 90–108. 
Gines, Kathryn T. Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. Indiana UP, 2014. 
Hamacher, Werner. “Afformative, Strike.” Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 1333-57. 
Habermas Jürgen. “Hannah Arendt’s Communicative Concept of Power.” Social Research, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 
1977, pp. 3-24. 
---. “Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism: The Contemporaneity of Walter Benjamin.” New German 
Critique, no. 17, Spring 1979, pp. 30-59. 
---. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Translated by William 
Rehg, MIT Press, 1996. 
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford UP, 1977. 
James, Joy. “All Power to the People! Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Communicative Power in a Racialized Democracy.” 
Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy, edited by Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook, Indiana UP, 2003, pp. 
249-67.  
Kant, Immanuel. ”The Metaphysics of Morals.” Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, 
Cambridge UP, 1996. 
---. The Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge UP, 1998. 
Kautzer, Chad. Radical Philosophy: An Introduction. Routledge, 2016. 
---. “Notes for a Critical Theory of Community Self-Defense.” Setting Sights: Histories and Reflections on 
Community Armed Self-Defense, edited by Scott Crow, PM Press, 2018, pp. 35-48. 
Kellner, Douglas. Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism. MacMillan, 1984. 
Loick, Daniel. A Critique of Sovereignty. Translated by Amanda DeMarco. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. 
Marcuse, Herbert. “Afterword to Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence.” Marxism, Revolution and Utopia: Collected 
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Volume 6. Routledge, 2014, pp. 123-127. 
Moruzzi, Norma Claire. Speaking Through the Mask: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Social Identity. Cornell UP, 
2000. 
Norton, Anne. “Heart of Darkness: Africa and African Americans in the Writings of Hannah Arendt.” Feminist 
Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, edited by Bonnie Honig, Pennsylvania State UP, 1995, pp. 247-61. 
Rancière, Jacques. Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, translated by Steven Corcoran, Continuum, 2010.  
Sitton, John F. “Hannah Arendt’s Argument for Council Democracy.” Polity, vol. 10, No. 1, Autumn 1987, pp. 80-
100. 
Wolin, Sheldon. “Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political.” Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, edited by Lewis P. 
Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, SUNY UP, 1994, pp. 289-306.  
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, Second Edition. Yale UP, 2004. 
 
Author's profile: Chad Kautzer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania. He is the author of Radical Philosophy: An Introduction (Routledge, 2016) and co-editor with 
Eduardo Mendieta of Pragmatism, Nation, and Race: Community in the Age of Empire (Indiana University Press, 
2009). He is currently working on a book about self-defense, popular sovereignty, and political subjectivity. Email: 
<chk316@lehigh.edu> 
 
 
